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The Wells Fargo Scandal and Efforts to Reform
Incentive-Based Compensation in Financial Institutions
I. INTRODUCTION
Without proper safeguards, incentive-based compensation
arrangements in financial institutions may encourage excessive risktaking by employees, leading to serious financial loss for financial
institutions.1 The incentive to take excessive risk was a contributing
factor to the financial crisis that began in 2007, with some saying that
employee incentives were “most at fault in contributing to the financial
crisis.”2 For example, in incentive-based compensation arrangements, a
high-risk loan has the potential to generate more revenue for the
financial institution, and consequently more compensation for the
employee who approved the loan, than a low-risk loan due to higher
These
compensation
interest generated by high-risk loans.3
arrangements were based on short-term revenue, and thereby
incentivized employees to expose the financial institution to more risk.4
The financial institution would often not realize this risk until the loan
was consummated and the employee had received compensation.5 To
combat this risk, financial institutions, with oversight from federal
regulators, have implemented compensation policies that tie pay to
performance, with risk evaluated at different points in time.6
1. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395, 36396
(June 25, 2010).
2. David F. Larker, et al., Follow the Money: Compensation, Risk, and the Financial
Crisis, STAN. CLOSER LOOK SERIES (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/
files/publication-pdf/cgri-closer-look-43-risk-compensation-financial-crisis.pdf. See also
Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation, 75 Fed. Reg. at 36396; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., INCENTIVE COMPENSATION PRACTICES: A REPORT ON THE
HORIZONTAL REVIEW OF PRACTICES AT LARGE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS (2011) [hereinafter
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/
HORIZONTAL REVIEW],
incentive-compensation-practices-report-201110.pdf.
3. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 5.
4. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 5.
5. See HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 5 (“Some of these risks may be realized
in the short term, while other may become apparent only over the long term.”).
6. E.g., HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 5. See also Financial Services Firms
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In 2009, federal agencies and financial institutions began to
develop policies and procedures to mitigate the incentive for excessive
risks arising from incentive-based compensation policies.7 The process
began when certain financial regulators—Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (“OCC”), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (“FRB”), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), and
Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”)—issued final guidance
(“Interagency
Guidance”)
on
incentive-based
compensation
arrangements, and financial institutions responded by implementing risk
conscious provisions into their incentive-based compensation policies.8
Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve initiated a horizontal review
(“Horizontal Review”) of incentive-compensation arrangements to
ensure that the compensation arrangements in financial institutions were
consistent with safe and sound banking policies outlined in the
Interagency Guidance.9 Congress specifically addressed incentivebased compensation in Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act” or “DoddFrank”)10 which requires six federal agencies—FRB; OCC; FDIC; the
National Credit Union Administration Board (“NCUA”); the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”); and the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (“FHFA”) (collectively the “Federal Regulators”)11—to
prescribe rules or issue guidelines that prohibit certain compensation
arrangements and require disclosure of compensation arrangements in
certain financial institutions.12 Pursuant to Section 956, Federal
Regulators initially proposed a rule in 2011 (“2011 Proposed Rule”) to
Increase Focus on Building Sound Risk Culture to Prevent Inappropriate Risk Taking,
MERCER (July 18, 2016), http://www.mercer.us/newsroom/financial-services-firms-increasefocus-on-building-sound-risk-culture-to-prevent-inappropriate-risk-taking.html (noting that
over 90% of financial firms have some type of policy which allows compensation to be
adjusted or forfeited).
7. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 1.
8. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395, 36396
(June 25, 2010); HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 1.
9. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 1–2.
10. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
956, 12 U.S.C. § 5641 (2015).
11. Dodd-Frank § 956, 12 U.S.C. § 5641(e)(1) (“The term ‘appropriate Federal
regulator’ means (1) the FRB, (2) the OCC, (3) the FDIC, (4) the OTS, (5) the NCUA, (6)
the SEC, and (7) the FHFA (Only six of these institutions remain after OTS authority was
transferred to the FDIC, OCC, and FRB pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 5412).
12. Dodd-Frank § 956(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5641(a)(1).
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prohibit certain incentive-based compensation arrangements.13 The
2011 Proposed Rule was not finalized, and on June 10, 2016, over five
years after the enactment of Dodd-Frank, Federal Regulators reproposed uniform rules (the “2016 Proposed Rule” or the “Proposed
Rule”) for incentive-based compensation arrangements in financial
institutions.14
Despite regulatory efforts and policy changes by financial
institutions, the incentive for excessive and inappropriate risks
continues to be a problem in financial institutions.15 When regulators
proposed uniform rules on compensation policies, financial institutions
fought back against additional regulation, arguing that current policies
promote a proper balance between risk and reward.16 In the wake of the
Wells Fargo scandal in the fall of 2016, however, politicians have
pressured regulators to reign in excessive compensation and impose
tougher regulations.17 With increased political pressure, regulators are
less likely to accept arguments against compensation rules for financial
institutions.18 Moreover, with the recent election of President Donald J.
Trump, who has stated that he plans to roll back Dodd-Frank and the
accompanying regulations, the fate of the Proposed Rule remains
uncertain.19 Regardless of whether the Proposed Rule is adopted, in
13. Proposed Rule on Incentive-based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg.
21170, 21170 (proposed Apr. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R.
§ 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 563h (OTS); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751
(NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. § 248 (SEC)).
14. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg.
37670, 37670 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R.
§ 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232
(FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, 303 (SEC)).
15. See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Menendez, et al. to Janet Yellen, Chair, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., et al. (Oct. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Menendez Letter],
https://www.menendez.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Incentive-Based-Pay-Letter-Wells-FargoSec-956-2016-10-26.pdf (asking Federal Regulators to strengthen and finalize proposed
rules on incentive-based compensation arrangements and noting that the improper sales
practices at Wells Fargo provide an example of continued problems in incentive-based
compensation).
16. Jesse Hamilton, Wells Fargo Scandal Hurts Wall Street’s Fight Against Pay Rules,
107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 353, 364–65 (Sept. 19, 2016).
17. Menendez Letter, supra note 15.
18. Hamilton, Wells Fargo Scandal Hurts Wall Street’s Fight Against Pay Rules, supra
note 16.
19. See Zeke Faux & Jenny Surane, Wall Street Hope Revived as Trump Signs Plan to
Roll Back Rules, 108 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 201 (Feb. 6, 2017) (noting that the new
administration will attempt to roll back many rules implemented as part of Dodd-Frank).
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continuing to address excessive risks created by incentive-based
compensation Federal Regulators must work with financial institutions
to determine whether policies encourage excessive risks.20 In addition,
financial institutions are advised to adjust their compensation policies to
appropriately reduce risk.21
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II summarizes the
regulatory measures and policy changes related to incentive-based
compensation since the financial crisis.22 Part III explains the Wells
Fargo scandal as it relates to incentive-based compensation.23 Part IV
describes
unintended consequences
of over-regulation
of
compensation.24 Part V concludes by explaining the possibility of
future regulation of incentive-based compensation.25
II. REGULATORY MEASURES AND POLICY CHANGES IN INCENTIVE-BASED
COMPENSATION SINCE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
In response to the financial crisis and pressure from regulators,
financial institutions have developed policies to decrease the incentive
for employees to expose the financial institution to excessive risk.26
Federal Regulators have reviewed compensation policies of financial
institutions and now require financial institutions to incorporate risk
analysis when developing compensation policies.27 As of July 18, 2016,
over 90% of banks had a policy of deferring compensation and
monitoring employee performance over an extended period of time.28

20. See Jeff Bater, OCC Flags Sales Practices at Banks in Semiannual Risk Report,
108 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 65 (Jan. 9, 2017) (noting that the OCC has flagged
governance of sales practices as a key risk facing the financial industry).
21. See Larker et al., supra note 2 (explaining that “one approach to reducing risk in
the bank industry is for regulators to monitor the riskiness of bank assets and restrict the
amount of leverage” and “another approach is for boards to restructure compensation
contracts to reduce incentive to take risk in the first place”).
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra Part V.
26. See HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 13 (explaining risk adjustments of
compensation and performance measures implemented after the financial crisis).
27. See Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395,
36399 (June 25, 2010) (“[F]acts and circumstances will determine which employees have
the ability to expose the organization to material amounts of risk.”).
28. MERCER, supra note 6.
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These compensation arrangements vary based on the size, complexity,
risk profile, and business strategy of each financial institution.29
When a financial institution implements a new compensation
policy, it must employ a complex balancing scheme to (1) “attract and
reward talented employees”; (2) “promote appropriate behavior”; and
(3) “[incentivize] highly productive work.”30 In addition, many
financial institutions include a risk management component when
“selecting performance measures, goal setting, and performance
evaluation, which is a significant development for aligning performance
with sound risk-taking.”31 The overarching goal of a financial
institution’s compensation policy should be to maximize shareholder
return while promoting a proper balance between risk-taking and risk
management.32 When issuing guidance or proposing rules on
compensation policies in financial institutions, Federal Regulators
should consider a highly individualized approach that incorporates this
complex balancing process.33 Since 2010, financial institutions have
worked with Federal Regulators to develop more risk-conscious
incentive-based compensation policies using a principles and risk-based
approach based on the specific characteristics of the financial
institution.34
Financial institutions and regulators are under pressure to
reform compensation policies and reduce the incentive to take excessive
risk.35 Due to the nature of the financial industry, however, it is
29. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. at 36406 n.6;
Comment Letter from McGuireWoods, LLP, to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y, Bd. of
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., et. al. (July 22, 2016) [hereinafter McGuireWoods
Comment on Proposed Rule], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-16/s70716-56.pdf.
30. Comment Letter from American Bankers Ass’s. et al., to Robert deV. Frierson,
Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., et al. (July 22, 2016) [hereinafter ABA
Comment on Proposed Rule], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-16/s70716-30.pdf.
31. MERCER, supra note 6.
32. ABA Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 30, at 2.
33. ABA Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 30, at 2.
34. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395, at
36396–97; Comment Letter from Hope A. Hardison, Senior Exec. Vice President, Wells
Fargo & Co., to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. (July
22, 2016) [hereinafter Wells Fargo Comment on Proposed Rule], https://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-07-16/s70716-48.pdf.
35. Joe Mont, Wells Fargo Scandal Prompts Senators to Focus on Clawbacks, KPMG,
COMPLIANCE WK. (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/the-filingcabinet/wells-fargo-scandal-prompts-senators-to-focus-on-clawbackskpmg#.WBfXfHeZPBI.
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impossible to completely eliminate risk.36 Therefore, financial
institutions must decide what level of risk is appropriate and develop
compensation policies that encourage employees to pursue objectives in
a manner consistent with the chosen level of risk.37 Meanwhile, Federal
Regulators are tasked with preventing banks from engaging in activities
which encourage excessive risk.38
A.

Regulatory Efforts to Reduce the Risk of Incentive-based
Compensation

In the wake of the financial crisis, four federal agencies—the
FRB, OCC, FDIC, and OTS39—issued Interagency Guidance which
requires financial institutions to develop compensation policies
consistent with safe and sound banking practices.40 The Interagency
Guidance requires financial institutions with incentive-based
compensation arrangements to ensure that compensation arrangements
provide employees with benefits “that appropriately balance risk and
reward,” are “compatible with effective controls and risk management,”
and are supported by sound governance, “including active and effective
oversight by the organization’s board of directors.”41 Specifically,
financial institutions must address the risk-taking behavior of individual
employees and groups of employees whose actions, when taken
together, could affect the risk profile of the institution.42
In addition to issuing Interagency Guidance, in late 2009
Federal Regulators initiated a Horizontal Review of incentive-based
compensation practices at twenty-five large, complex financial
institutions.43 The purpose of the Horizontal Review was: (1) to
Larker et al., supra note 2, at 1.
Larker et al., supra note 2, at 1.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
956, 12 U.S.C. § 5641(b) (2015).
39. The OTS ceased to exist on October 19, 2011. See Dodd-Frank § 312, 12 U.S.C. §
5412 (transferring powers and duties of OTS to FRB, FDIC, and OCC).
40. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395, 36396
(June 25, 2010).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 36413.
43. The financial institutions in the Horizontal Review were “Ally Financial Inc.;
American Express Company; Bank of America Corporation; The Bank of New York Mellon
Corporation; Capital One Financial Corporation; Citigroup Inc.; Discover Financial
36.
37.
38.
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examine the range of compensation practices across firms and (2)
“guide each financial institution in implementing the Interagency
Guidance.”44 The Horizontal Review found that every financial
institution included in the review had implemented policies to balance
risk and financial results.45 Although compensation practices improved,
the FRB report on the Horizontal Review noted that all of the firms
could do more to address the issue.46 After completing the Horizontal
Review, regulators continued to address problems in incentive-based
compensation policies through the normal examination process.47
The Dodd-Frank Act specifically addresses the excessive
amount of risk associated with incentive-based compensation
arrangements.48 Section 956 of Dodd-Frank requires six Federal
Regulators to jointly regulate incentive-based compensation
arrangements in covered financial institutions.49 Under Section 956, a
covered financial institution includes: a bank; bank holding company;
broker-dealer; credit union; investment advisor; Federal National
Mortgage Association; the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation;
and any other financial institution that Federal Regulators determine
should be treated as a covered financial institution (collectively
“Covered Institutions”).50 Section 956 provides an exception, however,
for financial institutions with assets of less than $1 billion, which will
not be subject to any rules proposed pursuant to Section 956.51 In
contrast, a Covered Institution with assets of $1 billion or greater must
disclose the structure of all incentive-based compensation arrangements

Services; The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.; JPMorgan Chase & Co.; Morgan Stanley;
Northern Trust Corporation; The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.; State Street
Corporation; SunTrust Banks, Inc.; U.S. Bancorp; and Wells Fargo & Company; and the
U.S. operations of Barclays plc, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse Group AG, Deutsche Bank AG,
HSBC Holdings plc, Royal Bank of Canada, The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc,
Societe Generale, and UBS AG.” HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 1 n.1.
44. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 1.
45. These policies include deferring compensation and evaluating performance over a
longer period. For more information see infra Part II.B.
46. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 1.
47. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 1.
48. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
956, 12 U.S.C. § 5641 (2015).
49. Dodd-Frank § 956(e)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5641(a)(1).
50. Dodd-Frank § 956(e)(2)(A)–(G), 12 U.S.C. § 5641(e)(2)(A)–(G).
51. Dodd-Frank § 956(f), 12 U.S.C. § 5641(f).
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to its appropriate Federal Regulator.52 Upon disclosure, the Federal
Regulator must determine whether the compensation structure provides
excessive compensation or could lead to material financial loss.53 In
addition, Federal Regulators must prohibit incentive-based
compensation that encourages inappropriate risk by providing excessive
compensation or compensation arrangements that could lead to material
financial loss.54 Under Section 956, Federal Regulators have the option
of either issuing guidance or proposing regulations on incentive-based
compensation arrangements.55
In 2011, Federal Regulators issued a proposed rule on incentivebased compensation policies in Covered Institutions.56 The 2011
Proposed Rule would have required executives at larger Covered
Institutions—those with at least $50 billion in assets—to defer at least
50% of compensation for three years.57 The 2011 Proposed Rule would
also have required the board of directors or a board committee of a
larger Covered Institution to approve all compensation arrangements for
certain covered employees who had “the ability to expose the entity to
possible losses that are substantial in relation to the entity’s size, capital
or overall risk tolerance.”58 Finally, the 2011 Proposed Rule would
have required all Covered Institutions to provide an annual report to the
appropriate Federal Regulator to determine compliance with the
regulations.59
The 2011 Proposed Rule was never finalized, but Federal
Regulators re-proposed rules pursuant to Section 956 on June 10,
2016.60 The Proposed Rule regulates incentive-based compensation61
52.
53.
54.
55.

Dodd-Frank § 956(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5641(a), (f).
Dodd-Frank § 956(a)(1)(A)–(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5641(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2015).
Dodd-Frank § 956(b)(1)–(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5641(b)(1)–(2).
Dodd-Frank § 956(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5641(a)(1); Proposed Rule on IncentiveBased Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37670, 37670 (proposed June 10, 2016)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC);
12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, 303
(SEC)).
56. Proposed Rule on Incentive-based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg.
21170, 21170 (proposed Apr. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R.
§ 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. §563h (OTS); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751
(NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 248 (SEC)).
57. Id. at 21216.
58. Id. at 21218.
59. Id. at 21215.
60. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at
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using three tiers of regulation based on total consolidated assets.62 Like
the 2011 Proposed Rule, the basic disclosure requirements and
prescriptions apply to all Covered Institutions.63 The Proposed Rule
also imposes uniform rules for determining covered employees, senior
executive officers (“SEOs”), and significant risk takers (“SRTs”) of
each Covered Institution.64 In addition to disclosure requirements,
Level 2 Covered Institutions—those with between $50 and $250 billion
in assets—must restrict the timing and amount of incentive-based
compensation for covered employees determined to be SEOs and
SRTs.65 Further restrictions apply to SEOs and SRTs at Level 1
Covered Institutions—those with $250 billion or more in assets.66
The restrictions on timing and amount of compensation apply to
covered employees at Level 1 and Level 2 Covered Institutions who
qualify as an SEO or SRT.67 An SEO is defined as an employee who,
regardless of title, salary, or compensation, performs the functions of a
senior officer or head of a major business line or control function of a
Covered Institution.68 A more complex test is used to determine the
SRTs of a Covered Institution.69 The SRT definition depends on
whether the employee meets the relative compensation test or the

37670.
61. Id. at 37832 (“Incentive-based compensation means any variable compensation,
fees, or benefits that serve as an incentive or reward for performance.”).
62. Id. at 37833.
63. Id. at 37834; Proposed Rule on Incentive-based Compensation Arrangements, 76
Fed. Reg. at 21215.
64. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at
37833.
65. Id. at 37835 (stating that applicable Level 1 incentive-based compensation must be
deferred for four years, whereas applicable Level 2 compensation need only be deferred for
three years) (requiring 50% of qualifying incentive-based compensation to be deferred for
Level 1 significant risk-takers and Level 2 senior executives) (stating that 40% of qualifying
incentive-based compensation be deferred for Level 2 significant risk-takers).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 37833.
68. Id. at 37833 (“Senior Executive Officer means any covered employee who holds
the title or, without regard to title, salary, or compensation, performs the function of one or
more of the following positions at a covered institution for any period of time in the relevant
performance period: president, chief executive officer, executive chairman, chief operating
officer, chief financial officer, chief investment officer, chief legal officer, chief lending
officer, chief risk officer, chief compliance officer, chief audit executive, chief credit
officer, chief accounting officer, or head of a major business line or control function.”).
69. Id.
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exposure test.70 Notwithstanding the employee’s actual authority or risk
exposure, a covered employee will be deemed an SRT if the employee:
(1) receives compensation of which at least one-third is incentive-based
compensation; and, (2) either (i) receives the highest 5% of
compensation compared to all other covered persons at a Level 1
institution—or 2% at a Level 2 institution; or (ii) may commit or expose
at least 0.5% or more of the common equity tier 1 capital.71 If an
employee is deemed to be an SEO or SRT, the Covered Institution must
defer a portion of his or her incentive-based compensation and subject
the incentive-based compensation to downward adjustment, forfeiture,
and clawback provisions, which are explained in more detail below.72
B.

Mandatory Deferrals, Downward Adjustments, and Clawbacks

Most compensation policies that balance risk and financial
results include a combination of risk adjustment of awards and deferral
of payments.73 For instance, a portion of incentive-based compensation
may be deferred for a specified period of time, and the compensation
will be subject to downward adjustment and clawback provisions during
the deferral period.74 A financial institution can use these provisions to
adjust or recoup an employee’s compensation if the employee exposes
the institution to excessive risk or material financial loss.75 Specifically,
downward adjustment provisions allow an employer to decrease
compensation that has not yet been paid to an employee.76
Id.
Id. at 37833–34, 37692 n. 83 (“In the proposed rule, the Agencies have tailored the
measure of capital to the type of covered institution. For most covered institutions, the
exposure test will be based on common equity tier 1 capital.”); Capital Adequacy of FDICSupervised Institutions, 12 C.F.R. § 324.22(b) (2016) (defining common equity tier as the
sum of the following: common stock, subject to certain limitations; retained earnings;
accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI); and any common equity tier 1 minority
interest subject to limitation under § 324.21(c); minus regulatory adjustments and
deductions in 12 C.F.R. § 324.22).
72. See infra Section II.B.
73. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 2.
74. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 15–17.
75. See, e.g., Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed.
Reg. 37670, 37836–37 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC);
12 C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R.
§ 1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, 303 (SEC)).
76. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at
37832.
70.
71.
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Alternatively, clawback provisions allow an employer to recoup
compensation that has already been paid and is fully vested to the
employee.77
While clawback and downward adjustment provisions are
common, Covered Institutions vary in the specific actions that trigger
enforcement of the provisions.78 One common weakness in downward
adjustment and clawback provisions is that the activity that triggers
enforcement is not broad enough to cover the many potential situations
that can arise.79 For example, a provision that provides for recoupment
of compensation upon a showing of fraud may not be triggered when an
employee exposes a financial institution to excessive risk in violation of
the financial institution’s risk management policy.80 Another common
issue involves the disparity in the level of discretion financial
institutions exercise when enforcing the provisions.81 In some cases, the
effectiveness of the provision depends on how eager the board is to
recoup the compensation, especially in the case of clawback provisions,
where the compensation has already vested.82 For this reason,
downward adjustments are used frequently, while clawbacks of
compensation are relatively rare.83 According to a recent survey of
financial institutions, over a two-year period approximately 50% of
financial institutions adjusted deferred compensation pursuant to a
downward adjustment provision.84 During that same period, only about
10% of financial institutions enforced clawback provisions.85
Several successful actions to recoup compensation from
employees highlight the potential effectiveness of clawback and

Id.
Michael Greene, Will Wells Fargo Scandal Lead to Changes in Corporate Pay
Plans?, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 13, 469, 475–76 (Oct. 5, 2016).
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Caleb Melby & Yalman Onaran, Clawing Back Bankers’ Pay at Wells Fargo is
Harder Than It Looks, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 11, 393, 405–06 (Sept. 21, 2016)
(noting that 76% of the largest banks have clawback policies but the policies are rarely
enforced); Greene, supra note 78, at 475 (noting that about half of compensation policies are
subject to compensation committee discretion).
82. Melby & Onaran, supra note 81, at 405; Greene, supra note 78, at 475.
83. Melby & Onaran, supra note 81, at 405.
84. Melby & Onaran, supra note 81, at 405; MERCER, supra note 6.
85. Melby & Onaran, supra note 81, at 405.
77.
78.
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downward adjustment provisions.86 In one of the most successful
enforcement actions, the SEC recouped over $600 million from the
CEO of UnitedHealth Group.87 Similarly, JPMorgan sought
recoupment from four traders who lost $6.2 billion in the London
Whale scandal.88 Three of the four traders voluntarily forfeited their
compensation, and JPMorgan ultimately settled with the fourth
employee to recoup a total of $100 million in compensation from the
group.89 More recently, when Wells Fargo was accused of opening over
two million fake customer accounts, the CEO and manager of
community banking voluntarily forfeited a total of $60 million in
unvested compensation.90 However, reputational harm rarely leads to
recoupment of vested compensation, and therefore Wells Fargo is
unlikely to recoup additional funds.91
Downward adjustment and clawback provisions generally
include enforcement triggers such as financial restatements, fraud, or
misconduct.92 While previous financial statutes focused recoupment
provisions primarily on material financial restatements, Section 956 of
Dodd-Frank imposes no such limitation.93 Under Section 956,
Greene, supra note 78, at 475.
The former CEO of United Health Group forfeited nearly $620 million in order to
settle civil and federal government claims related to stock option backdating. The
complaints came after dozens of companies issued stock options and fraudulently claimed
the options were granted on earlier dates when stock was trading at a lower price. For more
information, see Vanessa Fuhrmans & James Bandler, Ex-CEO Agrees to Give Back $620
Million, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 7, 2007), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119697535545316199.
88. The London Whale, Bruno Iksil, was a trader in the London Chief Investment
Office (CIO) of JP Morgan. The CIO was responsible for trading the difference between
deposits and commercial loans, which was about $350 billion. This money was primarily
invested in derivatives to hedge risk from other items on the balance sheet. Iksil became
known by the nickname, London Whale, due to the very large position he took in the CDS
markets. In 2012, a massive bet on a complex set of synthetic credit derivatives resulted in
a loss of $6.2 billion. JP Morgan recovered the maximum amount allowed under its
employment contracts through a combination of reducing outstanding awards and obtaining
repayment of awards previously paid. For more information, see S. PERM. SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS, JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF DERIVATIVES
RISKS AND ABUSES (2013), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report-jpmorgan-chasewhale-trades-a-case-history-of-derivatives-risks-and-abuses-march-15-2013.
89. Melby & Onaran, supra note 81, at 405.
90. Greene, supra note 78, at 475.
91. See Greene, supra note 78, at 475 (noting that Wells Fargo’s clawback provision
was triggered by financial restatement, which did not occur in connection with the
fraudulent accounts).
92. Greene, supra note 78, at 475.
93. Compare Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2015), with Dodd86.
87.
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enforcements to recoup compensation could result from an employee
doing the following: exposing the financial institution to inappropriate
risks; drawing an enforcement action; or exceeding the institution’s risk
limits and causing a loss.94 In contrast to specific enforcement triggers,
financial institutions may choose to develop deferred compensation
provisions with a wide range of enforcement triggers in order to give
the board of directors broad authority and discretion to enforce the
provision.95
Under current Interagency Guidance, financial institutions
determine their own deferred compensation and clawback policies with
oversight and guidance from financial regulators.96 Each financial
institution is responsible for ensuring that its incentive-based
compensation arrangements are consistent with the safety and
soundness policy of the institution.97 In addition, financial institutions
are permitted, and in some cases required, “to incorporate . . . new or
emerging methods that are likely to improve the organization’s longterm financial well-being.”98 However, a compensation policy that is
effective in one financial institution may not necessarily be effective in
another institution.99 In order to continue innovation in compensation
policies, Federal Regulators should continue to monitor and advise
boards of Covered Institutions as the boards establish compensation
policies based on the particular needs of the institution and considering
whether compensation is excessive or could lead to material financial
loss.100 Moreover, if uniform rules on incentive-based compensation

Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 956, 12 U.S.C. §
5641 (2015).
94. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg.
37670, 37835–36 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12
C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. §
1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, 303 (SEC)).
95. Greene, supra note 78, at 475–76.
96. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 10.
97. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395, 36397
(June 25, 2010).
98. Id. at 36400.
99. Id.
100. This position is consistent with the policy under current Interagency Guidance, and
the policy could be continued under revised guidance. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at
23; Letter from Edward J. DeMarco, Jr., Gen. Counsel and Dir. Regulatory Relations, Risk
Management Ass’n, to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
10 (July 20, 2016) [hereinafter RMA Comment on Proposed Rule], https://
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policies are adopted, the board of directors of financial institutions are
likely to use regulatory provisions as a substitute for independent
discretion.101
Under the Proposed Rule, Federal Regulators would require
Covered Institutions with $50 billion or more in assets to defer at least
40% of incentive-based compensation of SEOs and SRTs for a
minimum of four years.102 The deferred portion of incentive-based
compensation would be subject to forfeiture, downward adjustment, and
clawback.103 Deferred compensation could be forfeited or adjusted
downward for behavior such as: (i) “poor financial performance”; (ii)
“inappropriate risk taking”; (iii) “material risk management or control
failures”; or (iv) “non-compliance with statutory, regulatory, or
supervisory standards.”104 Similarly, vested compensation would be
subject to clawback as a result of the following: (i) “misconduct that
resulted in significant financial or reputational harm to the Covered
Institution”; (ii) fraud; or (iii) “intentional misrepresentation of
information used to determine . . . incentive-based compensation.”105
The severity of the employee’s actions and level of culpability usually
determine the amount of compensation the Covered Institution will
recoup.106
C.

Categorization of Financial Institutions for Purposes of
Regulation

When developing compensation policies, Federal Regulators
and financial institutions must consider the nexus between the actual
risk presented by incentive-based compensation and the level of
www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=OCC-201100012387&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
101. RMA Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 100, at 9–10 (noting that the
proposed rule “apparent[ly] shift[s] oversight from the board of directors of the institution to
the regulatory agencies”).
102. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg.
37670, 37835–36. (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12
C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. §
1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 (SEC)).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 37836.
105. Id. at 37837.
106. Id. at 37836.
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regulation.107 For example, the asset size of a financial institution is one
indicator of the level of risk, but asset size may not directly correlate
with incentive for excessive risk-taking.108 In addition, certain types of
activities may expose the institution to more risks than others.109 When
regulators attempt to decrease risk by regulating the compensation
arrangements of financial institutions and employees, the policies
should be tied to the actual risk exposure of each institution based on
the activities in which the institution is engaged.110
Despite Federal Regulators’ recognition that asset size is only
one of many factors to be considered when determining the proper
incentive-based compensation arrangements,111 in the Proposed Rule,
regulators relied almost entirely on asset size as an indicator of risktaking activity.112 Typically, Federal Regulators categorize financial
institutions using asset size, because larger financial institutions
“implicate[] the greatest risk[] for the broader economy and financial
system.”113 While size is an important indicator of an institution’s risk,
asset size alone may not be an accurate indicator of the risk an
institution imposes on the financial system.114 In some instances, “large
and diversified institutions pose less risk than those that are smaller but
highly concentrated.”115 Moreover, the failure of a large number of
107. See McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 52 (concluding
that the lack of a nexus between risk-taking activity and the restrictions imposed the
proposed rule will have an anti-competitive effect).
108. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg.
37670, 37688 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R.
§ 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232
(FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 (SEC)).
109. See id. (“Because of the scalability of the Federal Home Loan Bank business
model, it is possible for a Federal Home Loan Bank to pass back and forth over the assetsize threshold without any meaningful change in risk profile.”)
110. See generally Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg.
36395, 36400 (June 25, 2010) (requiring financial institutions to “take account of the full
range of risks that the employees’ activities may pose for the organization”).
111. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at
37708 (stating that the agencies are not attempting to apply a “one-size-fits-all” approach to
designing compensation policies and that the structure of incentive-based compensation
arrangement should comply with requirements in a manner consistent with the size,
complexity, risk tolerance, and business model of the individual covered institutions).
112. See id. at 37837 (applying the most stringent requirements to Level 1 and Level 2
financial institutions based solely on asset size).
113. Id. at 37688.
114. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. at 36399.
115. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 3.
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small banks can create as much systemic risk as the failure of a large
bank.116 For example, the savings and loan crisis was caused by
hundreds of thrifts failing due to rising interest rates, unstable funding,
and high-risk mortgage lending.117 The failure of so many small
financial institutions ultimately resulted in the failure of the Federal
Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation.118
The problem of using asset size as a proxy for risk to the
financial system is particularly important when subsidiaries are
regulated based on the asset size of the parent company.119 For
example, smaller lines of business within a larger Covered Institution
will be subject to regulations that are not comparable to those imposed
on similar-sized competitors.120 This problem is particularly important
in bank holding companies and financial holding companies that are
Covered Institutions under the Proposed Rule, because these companies
are more likely to participate in a broad range of financial activities.121
If the Proposed Rule is finalized, subsidiaries of these Covered
Institutions will be forced to compete with smaller stand-alone financial
institutions when recruiting and retaining employees.122 In order to
compete, the subsidiary may have to increase compensation for covered
employees or spin off certain subsidiaries.123 For this reason, the risk
exposure and level of regulation of a subsidiary should be determined
116. Frances Coppola, Big Banks Versus Small Banks: Size Doesn’t Matter, FORBES
(Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2013/12/10/big-banks-versussmall-banks-size-doesnt-matter/#386e7d4b1d86.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg.
37670, 37780 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R.
§ 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232
(FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 (SEC)) (“[The Proposed Rule] might affect the
ability of these subsidiaries to compete for managerial talent with stand-alone companies of
the same size as the subsidiary. If that were the case, the subsidiaries of larger parent
institutions may have to provide additional pay to individuals to compensate for the
relatively stricter compensation requirements and prohibitions.”).
120. See Wells Fargo Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 34, at 4.
121. For example, a large covered institution could spin off a division into a separate
financial institution which may not be subject to any compensation rules. See Proposed Rule
on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37780.
122. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at
37815; Jesse Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan,
106 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 759–60 (May 23, 2016).
123. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at
37815.
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without regard to the parent company.124
A final rule on incentive-based compensation should, at a
minimum, provide regulators discretion to regulate a
Covered
Institution based on the actual level of the risk inherent to the
institution.125 In order to determine the appropriate standard for each
Covered Institution, Federal Regulators could consider the activities,
complexity of operations, risk profile, and compensation practices.126
As a compromise, the final rule could provide general requirements
based upon asset size, but provide for relaxed or heightened
requirements based on the risk to the financial system of a particular
Covered Institution or its subsidiary.127 Under the latter approach,
regulators would be afforded a uniform approach to regulating
compensation while retaining the flexibility to regulate financial
institutions with similar size, complexity, and overall risk profile in the
same manner.128
D.

Compensation Policies Should Be Tailored to Specific Risk
Profiles of Employees and Departments

Incentive-based compensation accounts for approximately 50%
of the compensation paid to employees on Wall Street.129 In addition,
124. See Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg.
21170, 21202–17 (proposed Apr. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12
C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. §563h (OTS); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741,
751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 248 (SEC)) (applying the
restrictions to individual institutions without additional restrictions on subsidiaries based on
the parent company’s assets).
125. For example, the Proposed Rule provides a reservation of authority for Level 3
institutions, which permits regulators to require a Level 3 institution to comply with some or
all of the requirements of Level 1 or Level 2 institutions when the Level 3 institution has
between $10 billion and $50 billion in assets. The reverse would allow a Level 1 or Level 2
Covered Institution to comply with the regulation of as if it were a Level 3 Covered
Institution. See Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed.
Reg. 37670, 37715 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12
C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. §
1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 (SEC)).
126. Id.
127. See id. (allowing regulators discretion to regulate Level 3 Covered Institutions in
the same manner as Level 1 or Level 2 Covered Institutions).
128. Id.
129. Donna Borak, Andrew Ackerman & Christina Rexrode, New Rules Curbing Wall
Street Pay Proposed, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-rulescurbing-wall-street-pay-announced-1461247600.
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the top 5% of employees at the country’s top six banks would include a
total of 52,000 employees.130 Any compensation rule implemented by
Federal Regulators will affect the pay structures of a large portion of
those employees.131 Many of these employees, however, may not
expose the financial institutions to excessive risk of material loss.132 In
order to avoid overregulation, Covered Institutions and Federal
Regulators should focus on the particular risk exposure of certain
employees and groups of employees.133 For example, certain
employees may expose the Covered Institution to excessive risk by the
nature of their salary or degree of control over the institution.134
Similarly, a group of employees with relatively little control over the
Covered Institution may expose the institution to excessive risk based
on the aggregate risk exposure of the group.135
The approach under the Interagency Guidance is for financial
institutions to consider the full range of inherent risk arising from an
employee’s activities and whether those risks are material to either the
organization, or a business line or operating unit of the organization.136
If the employee exposes the organization to material risk, then the
employee will be considered a covered employee or material risk taker
(“MRT”) and subject to limits or restrictions on incentive-based
Id.
See Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg.
at 37815 (applying the SEO definition to any employee in a control function and applying
the SRT definition would include anyone with one-third incentive-based compensation who
is either in top 5% of highest paid employees or could potentially expose 0.5% of the
institution’s assets).
132. See id. at 37695 (stating that the purpose of the exposure text is to determine
whether the employee exposes the institution to market risk or credit risk); see also
McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29 (stating that financial advisors
do not expose the institution to credit risk or market risk).
133. Current Interagency Guidance allows financial institutions to determine covered
employees based on the ability to expose the institution to material amounts of risk.
Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395, 36399 (June 25,
2010).
134. See Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg.
37670, 37808 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R.
§ 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232
(FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 (SEC)) (applying the exposure test and relative
compensation test to determine significant risk takers).
135. See Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. at 36399
(requiring financial institutions to examine risk exposure of employees and groups of
employees who together can expose the institution to material risk of loss).
136. Id.
130.
131.
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compensation.137 This framework deems an employee an MRT based
upon the risk directly related to his or her employment, and seeks to
appropriately determine which employees could take the type of
inappropriate risks that could lead to material financial loss.138
The alternative approach in the Proposed Rule imposes a more
uniform test to determine the significant risk takers (“SRTs”) of a
Covered Institution.139 The SRT determination rests on the relative
compensation test and exposure test to discern whether the risk
exposure of an employee is excessive.140 The SRT test covers the most
highly compensated employees of the Covered Institution and those
who have the ability to expose 0.5% of the capital of a Covered
Institution.141 The more rigid SRT approach may cover more
employees than the MRT approach and subject certain individuals to
compensation restrictions who do not necessarily expose the financial
institution to excessive risks.142
The exposure test, in particular, could cover a broad range of
employees, because it does not require that the employee actually
expose the Covered Institution to any commitment of capital.143 For
example, the Proposed Rule assumes a loan officer exceeds the
threshold for the SRT test if the employee does not have an annual limit
of loan authority.144 Accordingly, a loan officer with authority to
approve $1,000 loans to each customer would be considered an SRT if
137. Id. at 36407.
138. Id.; Letter from BB&T Corp. et al., to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y, Bd. of

Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., et al., 9–10. (July 22, 2016) [hereinafter Regional
Banks Comment on Proposed Rule], https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2016/August/
20160826/R-1536/R-1536_072816_130383_335536110847_1.pdf.
139. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at
37808.
140. The relative compensation test depends upon whether the covered employee is
among the highest 5% of covered employees at a level 1 covered institution or among the
highest 2% of compensation at a level 2 Covered Institution. The exposure test depends on
whether the employee can expose at least 0.5% of tier 1 capital. See id. at 37833.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 37693–96 (“[E]xposure test relates to a covered person’s authority to
commit or expose significant amounts of an institution’s capital, regardless of whether or
not such exposures or commitments are realized.”).
143. Id.
144. See id. at 37696 (“If a covered person had no specific maximum amount of lending
for the year, but instead his or her lending was subject to approval on a rolling basis, then
the covered person would be assumed to have an authorized annual lending amount in
excess of the 0.5% threshold.”).
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the financial institution does not place annual limit on the number of
loans she could make.145 Although some banks may not limit the
amount of loans that a loan officer may make, each loan is heavily
scrutinized prior to its approval, thus limiting the particular loan
officer’s ability to expose the bank to risk through ill-advised loans.146
In either case, the loan officer would be subject to compensation
restrictions, regardless of whether she actually exercised her lending
authority, and even if every transaction she participated in was subject
to further approval.147 In order to remove this unintended application,
the SRT test should measure the risk exposure of the employee through
actual commitments of capital.148
In addition, certain financial advisors would be considered
SRTs, but not all financial advisors are capable of causing the strategic,
market, and liquidity risk that the rule is intended to eliminate.149 For
example, a financial advisor who invests capital for unrelated third
parties could be categorized as an SRT.150 Moreover, many financial
advisors subject to incentive-based compensation restrictions are
employed inside large banks.151 The financial advisors employed by
banks could face more stringent compensation restrictions than a
financial advisor who does similar work for an independent firm.152
Even though financial advisors who primarily handle client money in a
large bank pose a similar risk to the financial system as a financial
advisor in a stand-alone institution, the financial advisor within a large
bank will face more strict compensation restrictions.153
Overall, industry professionals have indicated that the
framework in the Proposed Rule does not reflect how Covered
Institutions calculate employee responsibilities and authority in
145.
146.
147.

Id.
McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 23.
Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at

37696.
McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 22.
McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 20.
McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 20.
Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan,
supra note 122.
152. Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan,
supra note 122.
153. Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan,
supra note 122.
148.
149.
150.
151.
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practice.154 For example, an employee in a sales capacity may receive a
high level of compensation relative to other employees, but the
employee’s sales may be subject to strict review and the employee may
have little authority to make final commitments on behalf of the
institution.155 Moreover, authorized limits for commitments may be
expressed in terms other than as a percentage of capital and may not be
easily translated into terms based on capital.156 For these reasons, many
industry professionals suggested excluding employees with
compensation below a certain threshold from the SRT and SEO tests.157
A compromise of using the MRT approach and giving compensation
levels more weight in the determination would provide a more
reasonable method for deciding which employees might expose the
Covered Institution to excessive risk of material loss.158
III. INCENTIVE-BASED COMPENSATION CONTINUES TO BE A PROBLEM IN
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
In the fall of 2016, Wells Fargo came under fire for its
compensation policies when the bank settled with regulators over the
creation of fraudulent accounts.159 The Los Angeles Times initially
broke the story that over two million fake accounts were created by
front-line employees who were under pressure to meet unrealistic sales

154. ABA Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 30, at 5 (“[E]ach covered institution
has its own risk governance model, policies and procedures, the allocation of authority for
business decisions is divided in ways that are unique to the institution.”) (citing Guidance on
Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395 (June 25, 2010)).
155. ABA Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 30, at 3.
156. ABA Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 30, at 5 (“For most bank personnel,
risk limits are not set in reference to ability to commit a specific amount of the firm’s
capital. In fact, for most risk takers in banks, it is not possible to convert their authorities
into a capital-based measure, at least not without making assumptions that are likely to
prove unrealistic or inaccurate, leading to results in conflict with the Agencies’ intent.”)
157. See McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 9 (suggesting a
$200,000 threshold for covered employees and $1 million threshold for SRTs); see also
Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 137, at 9 (suggesting an exclusion
for employees whose incentive-based compensation does not exceed $50,000).
158. See McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 16 (noting that
the SRT and SRT approach can be implemented into the current MRT framework).
159. See e.g., Jeff Bater, Wells Fargo to Pay $185 Million for Unauthorized Bank
Accounts, 107 Banking Rep. No. 9, at 305 (Sept. 12, 2016) (“Wells Fargo will pay $185
million in penalties and $5 million in remediation over allegations its employees secretly
opened unauthorized accounts to hit sales targets . . . .”).
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goals.160 Much of the responsibility for the scandal fell on John Stumpf,
the CEO of Wells Fargo, and Carrie Tolstedt, the executive in charge of
the community banking unit.161 Both have resigned and forfeited
unvested bonuses totaling $60 million.162 Although the total cost to the
institution is difficult to calculate, the bank faces total fines of $185
million from the OCC, CFPB, and State of California.163 The Wells
Fargo scandal has raised alarms that banks may not have effective
policies to monitor and mitigate excessively risky behavior by their
employees.164 Moreover, the scandal occurred while Federal Regulators
were in the process of finalizing rules on incentive-based compensation
under Section 956 of Dodd-Frank.165 The Proposed Rule, however,
may not have prevented the scandal even if it were finalized in advance
of the scandal, causing some to suggest the rules should be more
stringent than originally proposed.166
Wells Fargo was fined substantially for the fraudulent practices

160. James Rufus Koren, Wells Fargo to Pay $185 Million Settlement for ‘Outrageous’
Sales Culture, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wellsfargo-settlement-20160907-snap-story.html; E. Scott. Reckard, Wells Fargo’s Pressurecooker Sales Culture Comes at a Cost, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2013), http://
www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-sale-pressure-20131222-story.html.
161. Jenny Surane & Elizabeth Dexheimer, Stumpf Pay Surrender Buys Time but
Lawmakers Say It’s Not Enough, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 435–36 (Sept. 28,
2016).
162. Id. (noting that Stumpf forfeited approximately $41 million and Toldst forfeited
approximately $19 million).
163. In the Matter of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015 (Sept. 4,
2016); In the Matter of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., OCC No. 2016-079 (Sept. 6, 2016); State
of California v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. BC580778 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2016) (consent
order); see also Greene, supra note 78, at 475; Surane and Dexheimer, supra note 160.
164. See Jeff Bater, Wells Fargo Scandal Prompts Regulator to Take Closer Look at
Peers’ Practices, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 397 (Sept. 26, 2016) (reporting that
the OCC has begun an investigation into bank sales practices in response to the Wells Fargo
scandal).
165. See, e.g., Menendez Letter, supra note 15 (asking Federal Regulators to strengthen
and finalize proposed rules under Section 956 of Dodd-Frank).
166. It is unlikely the front-line employees engaged in the sales practices would have
been covered by the proposed rule. SEOs and SRTs are generally employees who (a) are in
charge of a line of business; (b) have the authority to expose large amounts of capital; or (c)
receive the highest compensation relative to others in the same division. See Proposed Rule
on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37670, 37833–34 (proposed
June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. §
372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§
240, 275, & 303 (SEC)). Moreover, the CEO and Director of Community Banking, who
likely would have been covered by the Proposed Rule, voluntarily forfeited approximately
$60 million in the wake of the scandal. Surane & Dexheimer, supra note 160, at 435.
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of its employees, and the bank continues to face additional costs and
threats of litigation.167 In addition to fines levied by the OCC, CFPB,
and State of California, several states and municipalities have
suspended business with Wells Fargo.168 For example, California, the
bank’s home state, along with Illinois, Ohio, and Massachusetts have
suspended state bond deals with Wells Fargo because of the scandal.169
Similarly, the cities of San Francisco, Chicago, and Seattle have
suspended business deals with the bank.170 The bank also faces
potential investigations from the Department of Justice and SEC, as
well as lawsuits from former customers, employees, and
shareholders.171 After the scandal was reported, a complaint was filed
for securities law violations, and shareholders initiated a lawsuit related
to the 9% drop in the stock price.172 Although the total extent of the
loss to Wells Fargo is yet to be determined, the bank certainly faces a
negative public perception after the scandal.173
The Wells Fargo scandal has led financial regulators and
financial institutions to evaluate incentive-based compensation

167. Kartikay Mehrotra, Laura J. Keller & Romy Varghese, Wells Fargo Wants Quiet
End to Scandal, Risking More Noise, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 813 (Dec. 12,
2016) (noting that in addition to fines, the bank faces investigation from federal agencies,
another federal department, state attorneys general, prosecutors’ offices and congressional
committees).
168. E.g., Romy Varghese, Massachusetts Becomes Latest State to Penalize Wells
Fargo, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 545 (Oct. 24, 2016).
169. Id.
170. Romy Varghese, Wells Fargo Faces Heat From Home State Officials After CEO
Exit, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 544 (Oct. 24, 2016).
171. Pamela Maclean & Laura J. Keller, Wells Fargo Bogus-Account Scandal Said to
Draw DOJ Investigation, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 359 (Sept. 19, 2016) (DOJ
Investigation); Kartikay Mehrotra, Wells Fargo Sued by Shareholders Over Cross-Selling
Scandal, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 452 (Oct. 3, 2016) (Shareholder Suit); Rob
Tricchinelli, Senators Ask for SEC Probe of Wells Fargo, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 13,
at 479 (Oct. 10, 2016) (SEC Investigation); Kartikay Mehrotra, Wells Fargo Ex-Managers’
Suit Puts Scandal Blame Higher Up Chain, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 834 (Dec.
12, 2016) (Former Employee Lawsuit); Chris Bruce, Wells Fargo Faces $5 Million Lawsuit
on Unauthorized Accounts, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 11 (Sept. 26, 2016) (Customer
Lawsuit).
172. Mehrotra, Wells Fargo Sued by Shareholders Over Cross-Selling Scandal, supra
note 171.
173. Lucinda Shen, Wells Fargo Scandal Could End Up Costing Bank $8 Billion,
FORTUNE (Oct. 25, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/24/wells-fargos-scandal-could-endup-costing-bank-8-billion/ (reporting that the scandal affected just 3% of Wells Fargo
customers and so far, has had little effect on revenue, but public opinion has fallen
dramatically, with 14% of customers deciding to bank elsewhere).
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policies.174 For example, the OCC is evaluating compensation
arrangements in certain financial institutions.175 The OCC sent a letter
to financial institutions under its regulatory authority requesting
information about the institutions’ compensation policies.176 The OCC
is also working with other regulators to ensure no other financial
institutions have sales practices that encourage employees to open
accounts without customer authorization.177 In addition, Wells Fargo
has eliminated product sales goals for its retail banking team and
eliminated bonuses for mortgage brokers in response to the scandal.178
In a Bloomberg Television interview, Paul Miller, an analyst at FBR
Capital Markets, said that Wells Fargo’s rivals also needed to be
sensitive to risk exposure of employees, because he is “very concerned
that regulators will really dig, [and come] after these banks
aggressively.”179 At least one large financial institution, JPMorgan
Chase, has proactively conducted a review of its compensation policies
since the news broke regarding Wells Fargo.180 JPMorgan addressed
minor issues in its incentive-based compensation policy, but did not find
any systemic risks.181
Lawmakers on Capitol Hill have also expressed concerns about
the Wells Fargo scandal.182 Both sides of the political spectrum have
weighed in on the scandal, with Republicans questioning the
effectiveness of the CFPB and Democrats calling for tougher
regulations.183 The Senate Banking Committee conducted an
174. E.g., Hugh Son & Jordyn Holman, JPMorgan Conducts ‘Deep Dive’ Review After
Wells Fargo Lapse, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 511 (Oct. 17, 2016); Jesse
Hamilton, Wall Street Banks to Face On-Site Reviews of Sales Practices, 107 Banking Rep.
(BNA) No. 16, at 575 (Oct. 31, 2016).
175. Emily Glazer & Christina Rexrode, Big U.S. Retail Bank Operations Under
Scrutiny After Wells Scandal, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/bigu-s-retail-bank-operations-under-scrutiny-follow-wells-scandal-1477400747;
Hamilton,
Wall Street Banks to Face On-Site Reviews of Sales Practices, supra note 174.
176. Glazer & Rexrode, supra note 175.
177. Hamilton, Wall Street Banks to Face On-Site Reviews of Sales Practices, supra
note 174, at 575.
178. Son & Holman, supra note 174; Laura J. Keller, Wells Fargo to Stop Paying
Brokers Bonuses for Selling Loans, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 862 (Dec. 19,
2016).
179. Son & Holman, supra note 174.
180. Son & Holman, supra note 174.
181. Son & Holman, supra note 174.
182. Menendez Letter, supra note 15.
183. Yuka Hayashi, Political Fight Over CFPB Heats Up After Wells Fargo Scandal,

2017]

INCENTIVE-BASED COMPENSATION REFORM

453

investigation into the scandal, and the House Financial Services
Committee is also investigating the matter.184 Senate Democrats have
even questioned KPMG, the one-time independent auditor of Wells
Fargo, about its failure to catch the abuse of the system.185 Others have
noted that the OCC and CFPB discovered the practices at Wells Fargo
as early as 2012.186 Neither the OCC nor the CFPB, however, brought
formal action against Wells Fargo when the sales practices first came to
light.187
As a result of the Wells Fargo scandal, regulators will likely
become more involved in compensation arrangements in financial
institutions.188 If regulators do not enforce existing rules, however,
additional regulations are unlikely to improve compensation policies.189
Even with regulatory oversight, Wells Fargo was able to continue the
scheme for several years and was not formally punished when the
fraudulent practices were initially reported.190 Comptroller Curry stated
that the 2016 Proposed Rule would have prevented the sales practices at
Wells Fargo.191 However, the OCC discovered the improper sales
practices at Wells Fargo as early as 2012 and failed to effectively
address the matter.192 Although lawmakers are pressuring regulators to
toughen rules on incentive-based compensation, regulators could have
initiated enforcement action under current rules and guidance.193
Perhaps Congress should allow Federal Regulators to focus on
effectively enforcing and monitoring financial institutions under the

WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/political-fight-over-cfpb-heatsup-after-wells-fargo-scandal-1474582741.
184. Surane & Dexheimer, supra note 160.
185. Mont, supra note 35.
186. Akshat Tewary, OCC Deserves More Scrutiny in Wake of Wells Fargo Fraud, AM.
BANKER (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/occ-deserves-morescrutiny-in-wake-of-wells-fraud.
187. Id.
188. See Hamilton, Wells Fargo Scandal Hurts Wall Street’s Fight Against Pay Rules,
supra note 16.
189. Hamilton, Wells Fargo Scandal Hurts Wall Street’s Fight Against Pay Rules, supra
note 16.
190. Hayashi, supra note 183.
191. Hearing Related to Unsafe and Unsound Sales Practices at Wells Fargo Before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2016) [hereinafter Senate
Hearing] (testimony of Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency).
192. Tewary, supra note 186.
193. Tewary, supra note 186.

454

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 21

current rules rather than pressuring regulators to adopt new
regulations.194
Had the Proposed Rule been in effect before Wells Fargo’s
scandalous conduct, it is difficult to determine whether or not Wells
Fargo would have altered its practices, thus avoiding its troubles.195
While the CEO and Director of Community Banking would have been
subject to the downward adjustment and clawback provisions of the
Proposed Rule, the 5,300 employees at Wells Fargo who were fired
leading up to the scandal likely would not have been subject to the more
stringent pay restrictions of the Proposed Rule.196 Moreover, even
without a regulation requiring recoupment of compensation, the CEO
and Director of Community Banking, who both resigned in the wake of
the scandal, forfeited a substantial amount of income.197 In total, the
CEO and Director of Community Banking forfeited $60 million in
unvested compensation.198 Furthermore, Wells Fargo has eliminated the
aggressive sales practices from its retail banking division and shifted
more pay towards salary and less toward incentive-based
compensation.199
In order to address other risks and prevent future scandals,
Federal Regulators must ensure financial institutions are complying
with current regulations and guidance.200 Federal Regulators should
194. See Tewary, supra note 186 (“No federal regulator ever stepped up to the plate to
initiate a punitive investigation against [Wells Fargo].”).
195. See Tewary, supra note 186 (“Section 956 was crafted to protect banks from
excessive risk-taking by bonus-seeking managers and traders. It will do little to protect
customers from dishonest retail banking practices like those perpetrated at Wells Fargo,
especially where those practices do not rise to the level of threatening the overall fiscal
health of the offending bank.”).
196. SEOs and SRTs are generally employees who (a) are in charge of a line of
business; (b) have the authority to expose large amounts of capital; or (c) receive the highest
compensation relative to others in the same division. See Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based
Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37670, 37833–34 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12
C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303
(SEC)).
197. Greene, supra note 78, at 475; Surane & Dexheimer, supra note 161, at 435.
198. Surane & Dexheimer, supra note 160, at 435.
199. The most stringent requirements only apply to SEO and SRT, which are generally
employees who: are in charge of a line of business; who have the authority to expose large
amounts of capital; or who receive the highest compensation relative to others in their
division. See Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg.
at 37835–38.
200. See James R. Koren, Federal Regulator Launches Broad Review of Banks’ Sales
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continue to monitor compensation arrangements to minimize excessive
risk in financial institutions.201 Likewise, financial institutions should
continue to monitor their compensation policies and ensure compliance
with safe and sound banking practices as outlined in the Interagency
Guidance.202 Regardless of whether the Proposed Rule could have
prevented the scandal, Federal Regulators are under increasing pressure
to implement tougher rules.203 Due to political pressure, regulators are
likely to monitor sales practices more closely in financial institutions
going forward, even if the Proposed Rule does not go into effect.204
IV. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF OVER-REGULATING INCENTIVEBASED COMPENSATION
Financial institutions and their employees are sensitive to
increased regulation of incentive-based compensation arrangements.205
When Federal Regulators initially proposed rules pursuant to Section
956 of Dodd-Frank, industry professionals and advocacy groups
submitted over 10,000 comments.206 Many of the comments discuss the
unintended consequences of the Proposed Rule, which could negatively
affect the financial industry.207 The unintended consequences of
Practices, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-bank-salesreview-20161025-snap-story.html (noting that the OCC is currently requesting information
from financial institutions and coordinating with other bank regulators to review
compensation policies); Tewary, supra note 184 (opining that regulators should have acted
sooner to prevent the stop the unlawful sales practices at Wells Fargo).
201. See Son & Holman, supra note 174 (noting that other banks should examine their
compensation policies because regulators will monitor banks more closely after the Wells
Fargo scandal).
202. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 15.
203. Menendez Letter, supra note 15.
204. See Menendez Letter, supra note 15 (requesting regulators to include more
stringent requirements in the proposed rule); see also Jeff Bater, OCC Flags Sales Practices
at Banks in Semiannual Risk Report, 108 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 65 (Jan 9, 2017)
(noting that the OCC continues to review sales practices in other large and midsize banks
and has added governance of sales practice as a key risk that can negatively affect public
trust in the financial industry).
205. See generally Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81
Fed. Reg. 37670, 37677 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC);
12 C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R.
§ 1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 (SEC)) (noting that Federal Regulators
received over 10,000 comments when rules were initially proposed under Section 956).
206. Id.
207. E.g., McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29; Wells Fargo
Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 34; Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule,
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potential rules must be fully reviewed when regulators are considering
the appropriate level of regulation for incentive-based compensation
arrangements.208 First, overregulation of compensation can lead to
increased or unfair competition for employees between a Covered
Institution and its less regulated competitors.209 Second, rigid
compensation policies could reduce the incentive for Covered
Institutions to develop new and innovative compensation policies.210
Finally, if regulation adversely affects incentive-based compensation,
employees may devalue incentive-based compensation and demand
more compensation be paid in the form of fixed compensation.211
A.

Covered Employees May Leave Financial Institutions for Less
Regulated Entities

One of the most serious unintended results of overregulation of
compensation is that the regulation will negatively affect a Covered
Institution’s ability to recruit and retain talented employees.212 For
instance, competition for talent between large Covered Institutions and
less-regulated, smaller Covered Institutions may result in more talented
employees choosing the less-regulated institutions.213 Moreover, when

supra note 138.
208. See HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 10 (“The interagency guidance helps to
avoid the potential hazards or unintended consequences that would be associated with rigid,
one-size-fits-all supervisory limits or formulas.”); see also McGuireWoods Comment on
Proposed Rule, supra note 29 (“[T]he prescriptive nature of the Proposed Rules fossilizes
current compensation practices and prevents innovation that appropriately balances risks
and rewards and allows financial institutions to adjust their compensation practices.”).
209. Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan,
supra note 122.
210. See generally McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29 (“[T]he
prescriptive nature of the Proposed Rules fossilizes current compensation practices and
prevents innovation that appropriately balances risks and rewards and allows financial
institutions to adjust their compensation practices.”).
211. See Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan,
supra note 122 (noting that companies affected the proposed rule may have to pay more to
stay competitive or to make up for stricter requirements).
212. Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan,
supra note 122; Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138.
213. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg.
37670, 37780 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R.
§ 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232
(FHFA); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, 303 (SEC)); Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a
Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan, supra note 122.
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Covered Institutions compete for talent with other industries that are not
subject to financial regulation, employees may choose to leave the
financial industry altogether.214 Overall, this level of competition for
talent requires innovative compensation policies that allow Covered
Institutions to compensate employees based on the needs of the
particular institution.215
When Covered Institutions compete for relatively similar talent
regardless of asset size, regulations that increase restrictions based on
asset size place larger Covered Institutions at a competitive
disadvantage.216 Specifically, if an employee has a choice of either
working at a large Covered Institution with income subject to
compensation restrictions or a smaller Covered Institution with little or
no restriction, then the employee is likely to choose the smaller Covered
Institution.217 In addition, as subsidiaries are treated the same as their
top-tier parent company, subsidiaries are further disadvantaged in the
competition for talent against stand-alone institutions.218 In order to
overcome this competition, large Covered Institutions may decide to
overpay in order to attract and retain the same talent.219 Paying
employees higher salaries could increase the Covered Institution’s risk
profile and prevent the institution from reacting to economic
downturns.220
The most successful financial advisors would be most affected
by the proposed rule, and therefore most likely leave a covered
institution for an unregulated competitor.221 Financial advisors with

Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 11.
Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 11.
Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at
37780; McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 3.
217. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 21.
218. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg.
37670, 37780 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R.
§ 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232
(FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 (SEC)).
219. Id. at 37778; Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over
JPMorgan, supra note 122.
220. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 10.
221. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 20; see also
Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan, supra note
122 (“Of the 669 registered investment advisers subject to the rule, the SEC estimated only
18 would face the toughest level of regulation. Many of those are inside banks, and even
the world’s largest money manager, BlackRock, doesn’t have enough proprietary assets to
214.
215.
216.
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income sufficient to meet the compensation requirements of the
Proposed Rule are also most likely to have the financial mobility to
move to another financial institution.222 These financial advisors would
likely find the mandatory deferral provisions unacceptable, and
therefore leave larger, more diversified Covered Institutions for
employment in smaller institutions that are not subject to the
regulation.223 Removing successful financial advisors from Covered
Institutions would eliminate a diversified revenue stream, which may be
unrelated to excessive risk-taking.224 This problem directly results from
regulating subsidiaries at the level of the top-tier parent company.225
Financial advisors employed by large banks would be subject to the
most stringent requirements, but even the largest stand-alone financial
management firms do not have sufficient assets to fall into the top tier
of regulation.226
This problem also presents issues with competition for talent
between smaller regional Covered Institutions and larger Covered
Institutions.227 In a regional bank with fewer high-earning employees in
a specific division, employees in that division may be deemed SRTs
based on the relative compensation test.228 For example, a covered
employee in a small capital markets division at a regional bank could be
designated an SRT based on relative compensation, but the same
put it in the top tier.”).
222. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 20.
223. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 20.
224. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 20. See Hamilton,
Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan, supra note 122 (“Asset
managers have become especially valuable for banks in recent years, bolstering profit
margins with their steady fee-based income as firms face pressures on lending and trading
revenue.”).
225. “The proposed rule would subject covered institution subsidiaries of a depository
institution holding company that is a Level 1 or Level 2 covered institution to the same
requirements as the depository institution holding company. . . . The main disadvantage of
such approach is that it may impose requirements and prohibitions on individuals employed
in smaller subsidiaries that are less likely to be in a position to expose the institution to
significant risks.” Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed.
Reg. 37670, 37780 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12
C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. §
1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 (SEC)).
226. See Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan,
supra note 121 (noting that even the largest independent money manager does not have
sufficient assets to fall under the top tier of regulation).
227. Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 2.
228. Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 10.
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employee may not be an SRT at a large national bank with a larger
number of high-earning employees.229 Moreover, since the SRT
determination is based on the level of income relative to the Covered
Institution’s other employees, an employee could fall in and out of the
SRT definition from year to year.230 This volatility may be enough to
drive talent to other institutions.231
Employees in non-risk taking support functions could also be
subject to restrictions of the Proposed Rule by virtue of their
employment at a Covered Institution.232 Covered Institutions employ
many employees in fields not specifically related to the financial
industry, particularly those who specialize in technology, human
resources, law, and compliance.233 These employees are the most likely
to find other industries attractive.234 One way the Covered Institution
can attract these employees into the financial industry is by providing
incentive-based compensation arrangements.235 An incentive-based
compensation arrangement not only provides the employee with an
incentive to work in the financial industry, but also allows the Covered
Institution to adjust the compensation in periods of economic
downturn.236 In sum, the incentive-based compensation structure
benefits both the institution and the individual employee.237 In some
cases, these employees are actually engaged in activities that reduce the
risk of loss to the Covered Institution.238 Including these employees in
the SEO and SRT definitions does little to reduce risks from incentive
compensation and makes it more difficult for the financial institution to
attract and retain high-quality employees with sought-after expertise.239
In addition, the potential volatility in pay from year to year could
actually subject financial institutions to additional risks associated with
difficulty in attracting and retaining high-quality talent in non-risk
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 10.
Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 11.
Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 11.
Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 11.
Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 11.
Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 11.
McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 2.
McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 11.
See generally McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 27, at 2.
Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 10.
Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 10.

460

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 21

taking roles.240
B.

Uniform Rules May Discourage Innovative Compensation
Policies

With a new rule proposed on incentive-based compensation,
most Covered Institutions will wait for the final rule before making any
major changed to their pay programs.241 If the Proposed Rule is
finalized, Covered Institutions could incorrectly conclude that the
standards set by the Federal Regulators are sufficient to fit their risk
profiles.242 Therefore, the Proposed Rule could discourage or inhibit
institutions from developing new and innovative compensation
arrangements.243 In some cases, complex, uniform rules make it more
difficult for the board of directors to oversee a company, while making
it easier to simply game the system.244 In order to avoid the
aforementioned issues, the board of directors of a Covered Institutions
must continue to develop appropriate and innovative compensation
practices.245
A financial institution should have the ability, with oversight
from Federal Regulators, to determine whether its employees are
exposing the financial institution to material risk of loss.246 As
previously noted, financial institutions need the ability to develop
compensation strategies that fit within their size, complexity, business
strategy, and risk profiles.247 The board of directors of financial
institutions must more closely monitor compensation policies to ensure
that the policies do not encourage employees to take excessive risks.248

Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 10.
Greene, supra note 78.
RMA Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 100, at 9–10 (noting that the
proposed rule “apparent[ly] shift[s] oversight from the board of directors to the regulators
agencies”).
243. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 32.
244. Greene, supra note 78.
245. See Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 13
(“[I]nstitutions should be responsible for designating their employees as SRTs in accordance
with principles and rules articulated by the agencies.”).
246. Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 13.
247. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395, 36406
(June 25, 2010).
248. Greene, supra note 78.
240.
241.
242.
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Flexibility in compensation rules encourages the board of directors to
innovate and develop new ways to reduce the risk in incentive-based
compensation.249 In order to promote further innovation, Federal
Regulators could encourage more board oversight rather than
could
implementing uniform rules,250 and Federal Regulators
supplement board discretion by implementing recordkeeping and
documentation of compensation enforcement actions.251
C.

Strict Rules on Compensation Could Result in Increased
Compensation

Uniform rules on compensation can increase the exact problems
the rules are meant to prohibit.252 Analysis of past legislation and
regulation of compensation suggests that additional rules are “generally
either ineffective or counterproductive.”253 For example, IRS rules
limiting the deductibility in non-incentive pay actually led to increases
in pay through additional stock options and other incentive
compensation plans.254 Similarly, SEC rules requiring disclosure of pay
and benchmarking used to determine pay actually provided firms a
justification for higher pay based on pay of similar firms.255 When
regulating incentive-based compensation, increased regulation could

ABA Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 30, at 2.
Greene, supra note 78.
For example, the disclosure and recordkeeping requirements in the 2016 Proposed
Rule require financial institutions to make additional information available to Federal
Regulators. See Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed.
Reg. 37670, 37803 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12
C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. §
1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 (SEC)).
252. Hearing on Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk Before the H. Comm. on
Fin. Serv., Hous., Cong. 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of J.W. Verret, Assistant Professor
Geo. Mason U. Sch. of Law) http://archives.financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/
111/verret.pdf.
253. Michael W. Faulkender & Jun Yang, Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing
Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking, HARV. L. REV. FORUM
(Dec.
12,
2012),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/12/12/the-dynamics-ofcompensation-peer-benchmarking/.
254. See Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive
Compensation Through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485, 521–23 (2009)
(noting that the initial result was for executives to receive an increase in base
compensation).
255. Faulkender & Yang, supra note 253.
249.
250.
251.
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result in devaluation of incentive-based pay, and therefore, employees
may demand more pay be attributed to salary rather than based on
performance.256
Prior federal efforts to reduce executive compensation have
actually resulted in increased compensation for executives.257 Federal
income tax legislation in 1992 limited the deduction for compensation
to top executives at $1 million.258 The limit on deductions only applied
to pay that was not tied to performance.259 While the intention was to
limit executive pay compared to that of the average worker, the result
was to shift more of executive compensation to performance-based
pay.260 In response to the rule, firms set base pay at $1 million and
increased compensation through performance-based policies.261
Similarly, the SEC attempted to reign in executive compensation by
requiring firms to disclose the amount of executive compensation,
including the method used to determine compensation, such as
comparison among peer firms.262 When more information about
executive pay was made public, executives could justify higher
compensation based on the pay of similarly situated executives in peer
companies.263 Moreover, a firm could adjust its peer group so its CEO
was in the median of CEOs for the peer group.264 In both cases,
following the additional restrictions on certain aspects of compensation,
the result was an increase in overall compensation for executives.265
In the present case, the Proposed Rule could result in an
increase in overall compensation, because employees will devalue
256. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at
37790 (“[T]he relatively long clawback horizon may generate uncertainty regarding
incentive-based compensation of [SEOs] and [SRTs]. . . . As a response to the potentially
increased uncertainty, senior executive officers and significant risk-takers may demand
higher levels of overall compensation, or substitution of incentive-based compensation with
other forms of compensation such as salary.”).
257. Faulkender & Yang, supra note 253.
258. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2015).
259. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(A)–(B).
260. Mullane, supra note 254, at 523–24.
261. Mullane, supra note 254, at 523–24.
262. For background and discussion of the SEC disclosure requirements see Kathryn J.
Kennedy, Excessive Executive Compensation: Prior Federal Attempts to Curb Perceived
Abuses, 10 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 196, 236 (2009).
263. Faulkender & Yang, supra note 253.
264. Faulkender & Yang, supra note 253.
265. Faulkender & Yang, supra note 253; Mullane, supra note 254.
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incentive-based compensation and therefore, demand more fixed
compensation.266 If incentive-based compensation is deferred for long
periods of time, employees may find fixed compensation more
desirable.267 When incentive-based compensation is deferred, an
employee may place a lower value on the compensation for several
reasons including: a discount for a delay in payment; risk of loss due to
termination of employment; risk of loss due to failure to attain
performance goals; discounted value for stock market risk if
compensation is equity-based; and a discount for risk of clawbacks.268
Each of these factors creates a significant gap in the value of deferred
compensation and the value of the compensation when the employee
earns the incentive-based compensation.269 Specifically, the aggregate
discount under the Proposed Rule can be as high as 35% based on all
discount factors.270 Furthermore, if employers are withholding the
employees’ compensation and using it for the company’s benefit, the
employee will likely want to be compensated for the lost value.271
Financial institutions could respond to this negative perception of
deferred compensation by shifting a larger portion of income to salary
and force regulators to fend off efforts to avoid the rule.272 This
discounted value for deferred compensation could also lead financial
institutions to shift more compensation to salary.273 If compensation
rules are ultimately adopted, employees with the option to leave the
financial institution must decide whether it is worth it to continue
working at a highly regulated financial institution.274
266. See Joseph E. Bachelder III, What is the Real Value of an Incentive Compensation
Award When It Is Made?; Executive Compensation, N.Y. L. J. (online) (Sept. 22, 2016)
(explaining the effects deferred compensation have on the present value of overall
compensation).
267. Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan,
supra note 122, at 760.
268. Bachelder, supra note 266.
269. Bachelder, supra note 266.
270. For a chart with the discount percentage applied to each factor see Bachelder,
supra note 266.
271. Bachelder III, supra note 266.
272. Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan,
supra note 122.
273. Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan,
supra note 122.
274. Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan,
supra note 122.
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The results from prior attempts to limit executive compensation
suggest that strict rules on compensation do not always lead to the
intended results.275 If the Proposed Rule follows the trend of past limits
on compensation, the rule could lead to an increase in overall pay, or at
least a shift towards fixed compensation.276 Federal Regulators may
actually reach their goal of limited incentive-based compensation under
the current rules.277 For example, if the trend towards restricting
incentive-based compensation through risk adjustments of awards and
monitoring performance at additional points in time, the overall goal of
the Proposed Rule can be obtained.278 Regulators can continue to
pressure Covered Institutions to reform compensation policies, and
policies will likely become more restrictive over time.279 If the same or
similar outcome is achieved under the current rules, perhaps additional
regulation is unnecessary.280
V. CONCLUSION
Despite efforts to improve compensation policies and reduce the
incentive for excessive risk, incentive-based compensation continues to

275. Hearing on Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk Before the H. Comm. on
Fin. Serv., Hous., Cong. 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of J.W. Verret, Assistant Professor
Geo. Mason U. Sch. of Law) http://archives.financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/
111/verret.pdf.
276. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg.
37670, 37785 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R.
§ 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232
(FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 (SEC)) (“As a response to the potentially
increased uncertainty, senior executive officers and significant risk-takers may demand
higher levels of overall compensation, or substitution of incentive-based compensation with
other forms of compensation such as salary.”).
277. See Emily Glazer & Christina Rexrode, Big U.S. Retail Bank Operations Under
Scrutiny After Wells Scandal, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/bigu-s-retail-bank-operations-under-scrutiny-follow-wells-scandal-1477400747 (noting that the
OCC is evaluating the practices at large and midsize banks in the aftermath of the Wells
Fargo scandal for improper sales practices).
278. See MERCER, supra note 6 (stating that as a result of regulatory pressure around
90% of financial institution have some type of policy which requires that all or a portion of
deferred or unvested awards can be adjusted or completely eliminated).
279. See Hamilton, Wall Street Banks to Face On-Site Reviews of Sales Practices, supra
note 174 (reporting that Federal Regulators are reviewing sales practices of financial
institutions under current rules and guidelines).
280. See ABA Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 30, at 9 (“[E]xcessive and
redundant deferral periods . . . are unnecessary to achieve the proposed rule’s objective.”).
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present significant issues for financial institutions.281 Due to the
continuing problems of incentive-based compensation policies in
financial institutions, as is illustrated by the recent Wells Fargo fiasco,
regulators are likely to become more involved in compensation policies
of financial institutions.282 The level of involvement Federal Regulators
choose to undertake remains uncertain.283 Regardless of the ultimate
policy chosen by regulators, some degree of discretion will be given to
financial institutions and regulators will focus more on detecting unsafe
or unsound compensation policies.284
With the election of President Trump, the outcome of the
Proposed Rule is even more uncertain.285 In addition, Michael
Piwowar, a current commissioner of the SEC who is likely to take over
as acting chairman, is not interested in passing a rule to restrict
incentive pay.286 Of the six agencies that must adopt rules under
Section 956, Piwowar was the only official to vote against the 2016
Proposed Rule.287 Furthermore, the new administration has pledged to
work with Congress to dismantle parts of Dodd-Frank, which could
remove the obligation of Federal Regulators to issue new rules on
incentive-based compensation.288 Under the current law, however,
Federal Regulators have an obligation to adopt some version of the
Proposed Rule.289 Since the rule must be jointly proposed, however, the
Surane & Dexheimer, supra note 161.
See Menendez Letter, supra note 15; Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based
Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37670, 37677 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12
C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303
(SEC)).
283. See Menendez Letter, supra note 15.
284. Koren, Federal Regulator Launches Broad Review of Banks’ Sales Practices,
supra note 200.
285. See Zeke Faux & Jenny Surane, Wall Street Hope Revived as Trump Signs Plan to
Roll Back Rules, 108 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 201 (Feb. 6, 2017) (noting that the new
administration will attempt to roll back many rules implemented as part of Dodd-Frank).
286. Ben Bain & Jesse Hamilton, Wall St. Gets Reprieve as SEC Official Says Bonus
Rule ‘Dead’, 108 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 99 (Jan 16, 2017). Trump has also pledged
to do a “big number on Dodd-Frank,” calling the law a “disaster.” Ben Bain & Jesse
Hamilton, Trump Pledges ‘Big Number’ on Dodd-Frank in Anti-Rule Push, 106 Banking
Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 202 (Feb. 6, 2017).
287. Bain & Hamilton, Wall St. Gets Reprieve as SEC Official Says Bonus Rule ‘Dead’,
supra note 286.
288. Bain & Hamilton, Trump Pledges ‘Big Number’ on Dodd-Frank in Anti-Rule Push,
supra note 286.
289. Bain & Hamilton, Wall St. Gets Reprieve as SEC Official Says Bonus Rule ‘Dead’,
281.
282.
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new leader of the SEC and potential new Director of the CFPB,290 are
likely to push for a much weaker version than the 2016 Proposed
Rule.291
While the fate of the Proposed Rule is uncertain, Federal
Regulators should continue to work with financial institutions to
develop innovative compensation arrangements that appropriately
manage risk and avoid unintended consequences.292 Federal Regulators
have presented many sound policies for reducing the risk that incentivebased compensation arrangements pose to the financial system.293 In
drafting new compensation rules Federal Regulators should consider the
improvements financial institutions have made to incentive-based
compensation arrangements.294 Regulators should also provide
flexibility to ensure that each financial institution has the ability to
implement an individualized incentive-based compensation plan that
will simultaneously reduce risk and foster growth.295
Any new rule on incentive-based compensation should focus on
reducing the incentive for excessive risks and avoid the unintended
consequences of overregulation.296 Federal Regulators should adopt an
approach that correlates with the degree of risk the institution poses to
the financial system.297 Regulators should prevent unfair competition
among institutions with similar risk profiles by evaluating the actual

supra note 286.
290. See Jeff Bater, Trump Win Turns CFPB Critic Into Contender for Agency Top Spot,
108 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 103 (Jan. 16, 2017) (noting that the former home builder,
intramural trampoline team, the “Flying Metadors,” member, and most conservative
member of the House of Representatives is a likely contender to lead the CFPB, who would
act like a “tooth fairy” for Wall Street to make all their wildest dreams come true).
291. Bain & Hamilton, Wall St. Gets Reprieve as SEC Official Says Bonus Rule ‘Dead’,
supra note 286.
292. Hearing on Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk Before the H. Comm. on
Fin. Serv., Hous., Cong. 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of J.W. Verret, Assistant Professor
Geo. Mason U. Sch. of Law) http://archives.financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/
111/verret.pdf.
293. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at
37677 (noting that the agencies saw improvements but proceeding to apply uniform
standards for compensation policies).
294. E.g., MERCER, supra note 6; Wells Fargo Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note
34, at 2.
295. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395 (June
25, 2010).
296. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29.
297. Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 5.
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risk the financial institution poses to the financial system rather than
relying on asset size as a proxy for the amount of risk.298 Furthermore,
the Federal Regulators must ensure that talented employees in positions
that pose little risk of material loss to financial institutions are not
driven from the financial industry into other industries with lessregulated compensation arrangements.299 If a uniform rule is ultimately
adopted, the rule should provide regulators with an appropriate degree
of discretion in order to avoid the unintended consequences that are
inherent in uniform compensation rules.
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